Noncommunicable diseases result from consuming unhealthy products, including tobacco, which are promoted by transnational corporations. The tobacco industry uses preemption to block or reverse tobacco control policies. Preemption removes authority from jurisdictions where tobacco companies' influence is weak and transfers it to jurisdictions where they have an advantage.
International trade agreements relocate decisions about tobacco control policy to venues where there is little opportunity for public scrutiny, participation, and debate. Tobacco companies are using these agreements to preempt domestic authority over tobacco policy. Other transnational corporations that profit by promoting unhealthy foods could do the same.
"Fast-track authority," in which Congress cedes ongoing oversight authority to the President, further distances the public from the debate. With international agreements binding governments to prioritize trade over health, transparency and public oversight of the trade negotiation process is necessary to safeguard public 1 Unlike infectious diseases, many NCDs result from exposure to or consumption of unhealthy products, including tobacco, which is promoted by transnational corporations. 2, 3 The tobacco companies' ability to dominate the public policymaking process is the main reason the global tobacco epidemic has persisted. 4 This situation is changing because of increasingly effective political mobilization by health interests at all levels, from enacting local laws mandating smoke-free workplaces to implementing the international World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). 5 The FCTC has accelerated the diffusion of strong health warning labels on tobacco packages 6 and promoted other policies to reduce tobacco use, including smoke-free environments and high taxes on tobacco products. 7 Although implementing these policies is good for health, the associated reductions in tobacco consumption are costing the tobacco companies billions of dollars in lost sales, 8 which motivates them to redouble their efforts to block these policies. One of the tobacco companies' key strategies to block or reverse tobacco control policies is preemption, in which they secure legislation by removing authority from subordinate jurisdictions where tobacco companies are weak and transfer it to jurisdictions where they are strong. 9 Recognizing the conflict between trade and health, during the negotiations that led to the FCTC, some sought an explicit provision establishing the primacy of health over trade, but others, who were concerned that such a provision would halt the treaty, blocked it. 22, 23 The continuing ambiguity has allowed challenges to be made to tobacco control policies under the World Trade Organization (WTO) provisions, including the large graphic warning labels required in Uruguay and the plain packaging used in Australia.
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(These disputes remained unresolved as of June 2014.) Tobacco companies were also using threats of similar action to oppose tobacco control measures in Africa. 25 The WTO grants investors (including tobacco companies) limited rights to challenge domestic policies. Investors who wish to challenge domestic policies alleging trade restrictions, intellectual property violations, or investment violations must convince a WTO member state to challenge the country that adopted the policy the investor opposes.
The WTO also provides a general exemption for health regulations that offers a defense to WTO member states to defend public health laws and regulations as long as they are not disguised trade barriers. 26 Since the mid-1990s, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and free-trade agreements (FTAs) have emerged as a particular threat to public health because these agreements often contain expanded language protecting intellectual property and investment rights. Unlike the WTO, BITs and FTAs include investor---state dispute settlement mechanisms that allow foreign investors to sue national governments "directly" to challenge policies, such as public health laws that affect the contents or labeling of products, which reduce the value of their investments 21 (Table 1) . It can almost be assumed that any public health regulation would reduce the value of a company's investments, because if those companies could maximize profits by selling healthier products they would, which would make the regulations unnecessary.
No BITs and only some FTAs exempt health regulations (Table 1) . For example, some challenges to public health and environmental laws under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) resulted in decisions that public benefit laws damaged foreign investments and required governments to compensate corporations for lost profits. 29 The lack of health law exemptions in BITs and the ambiguity of FTA language and dispute outcomes has made the negotiations of these agreements venues for tobacco companies to directly challenge, and attempt to preempt national and subnational laws they cannot overturn in domestic venues.
For example, although Philip Morris International (PMI) lost domestic legal challenges to graphic health warning labels in Uruguay and plain packaging in Australia, it concurrently filed BIT trade disputes 21, 30 and paid legal costs for the Dominican Republic, Ukraine, Honduras, and Cuba to challenge Australian plain packaging via the WTO.
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Although the tobacco companies have already been using trade agreements to challenge warnings on cigarette packages, there is no reason that they could not use these agreements to challenge other policies (such as taxes or smoke-free laws) on the grounds that they reduce the value of the companies' investments, because they lower cigarette consumption.
These dispute processes also lack transparency. Each BIT and FTA trade dispute is resolved privately by arbitration, 21 Tobacco companies have a long history of using litigation and the threat of litigation to deter tobacco control policies at the local level in the United States despite generally losing when the cases go to court. 9 They also have made intellectual property claims to fight warning labels and plain packaging despite their lawyers consistently advising them that these claims were invalid. 34 The cost of defending these suits, however, slowed the implementation of tobacco control policies in the United States 9 and internationally. 34, 35 The 2011 and 2012 BIT and WTO complaints over Australia's plain packaging law are having similar effects: New Zealand and Brazil indicated that they will wait GOVERNMENT, LAW, AND PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE on implementing plain packaging until the Australian case is resolved. 36 
EXPANDING OPPORTUNITIES FOR PREEMPTION
The negotiations for the TransPacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), which as of June 2014 involved 11 countries (including the United States) has provided tobacco companies another opportunity to secure provisions granting transnational corporations additional opportunities to use intellectual property or investment claims to block tobacco control measures through threats of litigation. In January 2014, a bipartisan group of 45 state attorneys wrote the US Trade Representative (USTR), highlighting how the TPP could facilitate challenges to federal, state, and local laws and regulations. 37 In addition, in 2013, the United States announced that it would pursue a Trans-Atlantic FTA between the United States and the European Union, 38 creating more opportunities for tobacco companies to preempt national and subnational legislation by shifting policymaking into closed trade supportive venues. Some tobacco control advocates have been calling for tobacco control regulations to be exempted from FTA investor---state dispute provisions. In May 2012, the USTR issued a press release that proposed to recognize the "unique status of tobacco products" by including language in the TPP allowing "governments to adopt regulations that impose originalneutral, science-based restrictions on specific tobacco products." 39(p2) This proposal, however, would only impose modest limitations on tobacco companies, who are wellpracticed at challenging "science."
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(In response to a December 2013 article in the New York Times on how the tobacco companies were using trade treaties to intimidate poor countries, 25 PMI responded with a letter to the editor stating, "The international trading and investment system has long protected the authority of governments to carry out this kind of legitimate, science-based public interest regulation.") This language, which seems designed to protect the US Food and Drug Administration regulation of tobacco products, would do nothing to protect improvements to package warning labels or limitations on advertising and promotion (because they are not the "product") or local laws (such as smoke-free laws or limitations on the sale of tobacco products to youths) where historically strong public health laws have been enacted. 12 In August 2013, Malaysia became the first TPP member to propose a "carve out" of tobacco 41 (a position endorsed by 45 state attorney generals and public health advocates 37 ), but as of June 2014, Malaysia remained the only member country to do so. Tobacco company efforts to influence the TPP negotiations illustrate the importance they attach to trade agreements. In response to a USTR request for comments, PMI submitted a letter supporting an investor---state dispute settlement mechanism, because health "initiatives would severely impact PMI's valuable trademark rights," specifically referencing Australia's then-proposed plain packaging law. 42 In February 2012, PMI, along with Chevron, Target, and Pharmaceutical Research and Manufactures of America, sponsored a private Washington, DC, meeting for US governors, US trade negotiators, and top trade negotiators and representatives from the TPP countries to discuss the TPP. 43 The public was excluded.
Although the USTR has sponsored a series of brief conference calls and other meetings for public health (and other public interest) "stakeholders" that the USTR argues provides transparency, the negotiations and text still remained secret as of June 2014. The little knowledge the public has of the intellectual property provisions of the TPP were the result of a copy of that section of the treaty being provided to WikiLeaks. 44 
FAST TRACK AND PREEMPTION
"Fast-track" presidential authority (renamed trade promotion authority in 2002) is another way to limit transparency and public access to the policymaking process around trade. 45 including one by former USTR Carla Hills that promoted fasttrack renewal of fast track to expedite NAFTA negotiations. 45, 52 In 1997 and 1998, PMI participated in the business coalition America Leads on Trade 53 to renew fast track. 54 Even so, Congress rejected fast-track renewal in September 1998. 55 In 2001, American
Leads on Trade (including PMI) urged farmers to support fast track, arguing that FTAs would boost exports and increase jobs. 56 This push succeeded, 45 which assisted in developing 11 FTAs (Table 2) .
PUBLIC OVERSIGHT
An increase in transparency with the help of the WikiLeaks' February 2011 release of the TPP section on intellectual property created more public outcry and allowed several groups to publically scrutinize it, which led to a more nuanced discussion reflecting a wide variety of particular interests. For example, in addition to public health concerns raised about tobacco and access to medicines, the Electronic Frontier Foundation and its analogs in other countries expressed concern about the TPP preempting national policymaking because the intellectual property chapter would restrict digital freedom by (among many others things) narrowing fair use exceptions, expanding copyright terms, and placing greater liability on Internet intermediaries. 57 The public outcry led to increased public pressure to make the TPP negotiation process more transparent, including posting provisions of the treaty for public comment, and to remove problematic clauses.
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In February 2014, in response to public pressure, including campaigning by public health advocates, 59 the Obama Administration proposed to create a Public Interest Trade Advisory Committee (PITAC) to "provide a cross-cutting platform for input into negotiations." 60 Although a small step forward, Trade Advisory Committee (TAC) members would be bound by nondisclosure agreements that would limit their role in true public discourse. In addition, the proposed public interest members would be placed into less influential TAC group tiers than industry representatives. 61 As of June 2014, the creation of PITAC remained pending, and calls to allow public comment on specific provisions were being ignored. Public health advocates should consider reviving Representative Mike Michaud and Senator Sherrod Brown's proposed Trade, Reform, Accountability, Development, and Employment Act, first introduced in 2009, to provide a permanent mechanism to promote public oversight and transparency. 62 The act would require a comprehensive assessment of the impact of current trade agreements before any new agreement could be approved, which includes rejecting fast track and requiring more frequent consultations with any committee of Congress with jurisdiction over any area covered by the negotiations. The act also stipulates that a provision be included that gives priority to the implementation of international agreements related to public health (e.g., the FCTC), thus attempting to establish explicit primacy of health over trade that the FCTC negotiations failed to do. 22 
CONCLUSIONS
Trade agreements relocate discussions about health and trade to venues in which there is little opportunity for public scrutiny, participation, and debate. These agreements are being used by tobacco companies to preempt domestic authority over tobacco policy by removing the policy dispute to an arena that favors minimal regulation. They constitute a platform for transnational corporations who profit by promoting products associated with NCDs, such as unhealthy foods, to challenge and preempt governmental population-level interventions, such as regulating salt or sugar content in food.
Fast-track authority further distances the public from the debate. Because 2 proposed US FTAs could provide venues through which tobacco control and public health generally can be challenged, it is important for the public and public health advocates to be aware of US domestic mechanisms and procedures that allow FTAs to be negotiated with little oversight.
Transparency and public oversight of the trade negotiation process are important because these international agreements bind governments at all levels to prioritize trade over health. This public oversight could then be used to ensure that FTAs embody the 2011 Institute of Medicine recommendation on the importance of avoiding preemption and "avoid language that hinders public health action. 
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